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FULL COST IN TRANSLATION: 
AWARDING EXPERT WITNESS FEES 
IN COPYRIGHT LITIGATION 
Nicholas Vennekotter* 
 
When deciding whether to bring or defend against copyright infringement 
claims, the cost of litigation plays a critical role in the minds of potential 
litigants.  The cost of retaining experts, particularly, is a large factor in this 
calculus.  Although U.S. courts generally require each party to cover the cost 
of their own legal fees during litigation, the Copyright Act of 1976 permits 
courts, in their discretion, to allow the prevailing party to recover “full 
costs.”  Yet, the language “full costs” is considered ambiguous, which leads 
to inconsistent awards of costs among the appellate courts.  The circuits 
disagree whether the Copyright Act merely allows parties to recover modest 
costs, such as docket fees and witness travel expenses, or to recover more 
substantial costs, like expert witness fees.  Accordingly, the level of discretion 
afforded to a court can essentially be the difference between an award that 
includes nontaxable costs in the tens of millions of dollars and an award that 
does not include nontaxable costs at all.  Recently, in Oracle USA, Inc. v. 
Rimini Street, Inc., the judgment awarded to the prevailing party included 
an additional $12 million in costs because it was brought in a circuit that 
allows awards of nontaxable costs under the Copyright Act. 
This Note concludes that the Copyright Act, as it stands, does not allow a 
court to award expert witness fees to a prevailing party.  However, given the 
objectively important need for expert testimony in copyright litigation, this 
Note argues that Congress should amend the Copyright Act to allow for the 
shifting of expert fees at courts’ discretion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A critical issue in copyright law is finding the proper balance between a 
creator’s property rights to his work and the public’s access to that work.1  
To equally promote these competing interests within copyright litigation, fee 
shifting2 is applied without favoritism to either a prevailing plaintiff or a 
 
 1. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989). 
 2. Fee-shifting, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The transfer of 
responsibility for paying fees, esp[ecially] attorney’s fees, from the prevailing party to the 
losing party.”).  For a discussion of competing philosophies regarding fee-shifting, see infra 
notes 14–30 and accompanying text. 
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prevailing defendant.3  Because legal fees can greatly outweigh damages that 
a plaintiff may recover, the opportunity to recover costs can be a decisive 
factor when a plaintiff decides whether to file suit to enforce its copyrights.4  
Defendants too must grapple with the potential costs of litigation when 
deciding whether to defend against a copyright infringement claim or instead 
seek a quick settlement.5 
Under 17 U.S.C. § 505, courts may exercise discretion in awarding parties 
“full costs” in copyright cases.6  At the very least, full costs include taxable 
costs7 under Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are 
enumerated in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1821.8  However, circuit courts of 
appeals are split on whether nontaxable costs,9 which are not included within 
the guidelines of §§ 1920 and 1821, are nonetheless recoverable under § 505 
due to its broad language:  “full costs.”10 
This Note examines whether expert witness fees should be awarded as 
nontaxable costs to prevailing parties in copyright infringement cases.  This 
Note concludes that courts should have discretion to award expert witness 
fees to parties as recoverable costs in copyright litigation.  Given the need for 
expert witnesses in copyright litigation, allowing parties to recover expert 
fees maintains the balance between creators’ property rights and the public’s 
access to works.  Because the U.S. Supreme Court’s current precedent does 
not allow for a judicial solution to address this need, Congress should amend 
§ 505 to allow parties to recover expert fees in copyright litigation. 
Part I provides relevant background regarding fee shifting in copyright, 
awards of costs, the language of § 505, and fee shifting in other intellectual 
property statutes.  Part II examines the Copyright Act and potential remedies 
 
 3. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994) (rejecting the dual standard in 
favor of equitable discretion to both prevailing plaintiffs and defendants).  For more 
information on the “dual standard,” see infra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
 4. See Sandra Aistars, Devlin Harline & Mark Schultz, Copyright Principles and 
Priorities to Foster a Creative Digital Marketplace, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 769, 788 (2016). 
 5. See James Trigg, Bakari Brock & Andrew Pequignot, A Question of Cost, COPYRIGHT 
WORLD, May 2007, at 13, 14, https://www.kilpatricktownsend.com/~/media/Files/ 
articles/AQuestionofCostRecentDecisionsontheCopyrightAct.ashx [https://perma.cc/T74A-
E6RP]. 
 6. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012); infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 7. Taxable Cost, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A litigation-related 
expense that the prevailing party is entitled to as part of the court’s award.”).  Taxable costs 
are not limited to costs that can have a tax imposed on them. 
 8. See infra notes 73–74 and accompanying text (characterizing the expenses generally 
covered as taxable costs). 
 9. This Note focuses primarily on expert fees as nontaxable costs.  For a brief description 
of other nontaxable costs that may also be awarded, see infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 10. Compare Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm’t Distrib., 429 F.3d 869, 885 
(9th Cir. 2005) (permitting an award of expert witness fees after finding that to ignore the 
word “full” would fail to give every word in § 505 meaning), and InvesSys, Inc. v. McGraw-
Hill Cos., 369 F.3d 16, 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2004) (permitting an award of costs that included 
computer-aided legal research), with Artisan Contractors Ass’n of Am. v. Frontier Ins. Co., 
275 F.3d 1038, 1039–40 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that expert witness fees were not taxable as 
costs because § 505 lacks any clear reference to witness fees), and Pinkham v. Camex, Inc., 
84 F.3d 292, 295 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that the “full costs” language did not evidence 
congressional intent to award costs under § 505 differently from costs under other statutes). 
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for costly copyright litigation.  Part III illustrates the conflict among the 
circuit courts regarding whether the Copyright Act allows for expert witness 
fees to be awarded as costs.  Part IV concludes that, while the Copyright Act 
does not presently allow courts to award expert witness fees, the Act should 
be amended to allow for such awards. 
I.  THE FRAMEWORK FOR AWARDING COSTS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
In copyright law, a network of statutes and case law governs appropriate 
awards of costs.  Although the extent of awardable costs is generally clear 
within federal law, the Copyright Act’s fee-shifting provision has led to 
confusion among courts regarding what may be awarded in copyright 
infringement cases.11  A notable strand of this confusion is whether 
prevailing parties are entitled to expert costs—often a significant component 
of litigation expenses.12  Part I.A examines fee shifting and its purpose in 
both U.S. courts generally and in copyright law.  Part I.B discusses awards 
of costs as a form of fee shifting, expert fees as a significant cost in copyright 
law, and what is required to allow for the shifting of expert fees.  Part I.C 
examines the ambiguous language of “full costs” within the Copyright Act’s 
fee-shifting provision, 17 U.S.C. § 505.  Part I.D reviews the shifting of costs 
within other areas of intellectual property law:  the Lanham Act and the 
Patent Act. 
A.  Fee Shifting in U.S. Courts and Its Evolution Within Copyright Law 
In U.S. courts, fee shifting is generally not permitted absent statutory 
authority stating otherwise.13  The Copyright Act grants such authority and 
allows courts to shift full costs and attorney’s fees to both prevailing 
plaintiffs and defendants. 
1.  Fee Shifting in U.S. Courts 
Two rules govern competing fee-shifting philosophies.14  The English rule 
requires the losing party to pay the prevailing party’s legal fees.15  In contrast, 
the American rule requires each party to pay its own legal fees absent a 
statute or contract providing otherwise.16 
 
 11. See infra Part III (discussing the circuit split regarding the permissible scope of awards 
of costs under § 505). 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorneys’ Fees for Abuses of the Judicial System, 61 N.C. L. 
REV. 613, 613 (1983). 
 14. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule 
on Attorney Fees:  An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 
327, 328–29 (2013). 
 15. Id. at 329. 
 16. Mallor, supra note 13, at 613. 
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Federal fee-shifting statutes present variations of these two philosophies.17  
Such statutes authorize an award of fees to the prevailing party.18  The 
Supreme Court defines prevailing parties as parties that obtain “enforceable 
judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent decrees.”19  Fee-shifting 
statutes can allow for the recovery of both costs and attorney’s fees:  “costs” 
refers to expenditures that the attorney pays to third parties to carry out a 
case, and “attorney’s fees” refers to the compensation an attorney earns for 
legal services rendered.20  Thus, fee-shifting statutes that permit courts to 
require one party to pay another party’s fees constitute a significant departure 
from the longstanding American rule.21 
Absent fee-shifting statutes, courts tend to favor the American rule because 
it discourages abusive clients and their attorneys from instituting 
unrestrained litigation or unreasonable fees, it prevents those with 
meritorious yet small claims from shying away from litigation to avoid being 
burdened with their opponents’ fees, and it avoids burdensome judicial 
administration resulting from litigation fees.22  Nonetheless, the English rule 
also can provide benefits because it potentially deters frivolous or 
nonmeritorious lawsuits, reduces parties’ incentives to drive up their 
adversaries’ costs, and reduces the expected marginal costs of expenditures 
on a party’s attorney.23 
Despite the common law’s adherence to the American rule, the Supreme 
Court has reaffirmed three major exceptions to the American rule that stem 
from common law:  the common fund doctrine, the common benefit doctrine, 
and the bad faith doctrine.24  Under the common fund doctrine, attorneys “are 
entitled to reasonable compensation for their professional services in 
establishing a lien, in behalf of the unsecured creditors.”25  Under the 
common benefit doctrine—a derivative of the common fund doctrine—“a 
litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons 
other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from 
the fund as a whole.”26  And under the bad faith doctrine, “a federal court 
 
 17. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 14, at 329. 
 18. Prevailing Party, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A party in whose favor 
a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded . . . .”). 
 19. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 604 (2001) (“[E]nforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent 
decrees create the ‘material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties’ necessary to 
permit an award of attorney’s fees.” (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792–93 (1989))). 
 20. See infra notes 57–60 and accompanying text. 
 21. See Mallor, supra note 13, at 613–14. 
 22. Mary Jo Hudson, Comment, Expert Witness Fees as Taxable Costs in Federal 
Courts—the Exceptions and the Rule, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1207, 1211 (1987). 
 23. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 14, at 335–36. 
 24. Samuel R. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys’ Fees:  What Is “Reasonable”?, 126 U. 
PA. L. REV. 281, 295 (1977). 
 25. Cent. R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 127 (1884). 
 26. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980). 
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may award counsel fees to a successful party when his opponent has acted 
‘in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.’”27 
An approach that relies on bad faith as a prerequisite for an award to a 
prevailing plaintiff or defendant has been criticized as potentially 
disadvantaging defendants.28  The “inquiry into a non-prevailing plaintiff’s 
culpability goes solely to the conduct of the litigation,” whereas the “inquiry 
concerning a non-prevailing defendant emphasizes, in addition or in the 
alternative, the underlying infringing activities.”29  Accordingly, defendants 
will be found culpable much more often under this inquiry.30 
Although most fee-shifting statutes do not distinguish between prevailing 
plaintiffs and prevailing defendants, the Supreme Court has held that a dual 
standard applies to parties suing under several civil rights statutes.31  Under 
this dual standard, prevailing plaintiffs are awarded fees whereas prevailing 
defendants are not.32  This seeks to encourage potential plaintiffs to bring 
meritorious claims that vindicate the public interest, such as civil rights 
claims, without deterring those plaintiffs with the possibility of having to pay 
a prevailing defendant’s fees.33 
However, the dual standard does not apply to fee shifting under the 
Copyright Act.  In Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.,34 the Court held that, unlike civil 
rights claims, defendants with meritorious defenses to copyright claims 
“should be encouraged to litigate them to the same extent that plaintiffs are 
encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of infringement.”35  This is because 
a successful defense of a creative work could lead to its increased public 
exposure, which would allow for further creativity.36  Thus, successful 
copyright infringement claims and defenses can further the goals of the 
Copyright Act.37  Because copyright law attempts to balance creators’ 
 
 27. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (quoting 6 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE ¶ 54.77 (2d ed. 1972)). 
 28. Peter Jaszi, 505 and All That—the Defendant’s Dilemma, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
107, 118–19 (1992). 
 29. Id. at 118. 
 30. See id. at 118–19. 
 31. See Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758–59 (1989) (holding 
that the dual standard applied to parties suing under several civil rights statutes despite the 
statutes not distinguishing between prevailing plaintiffs and defendants).  For example, 
regarding 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3, the Court noted that this constraint was “necessary to carry 
out Congress’ intention that individuals injured by racial discrimination act as ‘“private 
attorney[s] general,” vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.’” 
Id. at 759 (alteration in original) (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 
(1968) (per curiam)).  This rationale was also applied to the Emergency School Aid Act, 20 
U.S.C. § 1617, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). See id. 
at 758–59. 
 32. See id. at 759. 
 33. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94-970, AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES BY FEDERAL COURTS 
AND FEDERAL AGENCIES 11 (2009). 
 34. 510 U.S. 517 (1994). 
 35. Id. at 527. 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. 
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property rights with the public’s access to a work,38 § 505 allows for fee 
shifting without favoritism toward either a prevailing plaintiff or prevailing 
defendant to equally promote these interests.39 
2.  The Evolution of Fee Shifting Within Copyright Law 
Today, the Copyright Act permits fee shifting pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505, 
which provides: 
In any civil action under [the Copyright Act], the court in its discretion may 
allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United 
States or an officer thereof.  Except as otherwise provided by this title, the 
court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as 
part of the costs.40 
Despite its simple language, § 505 has undergone minor changes with each 
iteration of the Copyright Act. 
The Copyright Act of 1790 was the first federal copyright statute enacted 
in the United States.41  The 1790 Act’s stated purpose was to encourage 
“learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors 
and proprietors of such copies.”42  At the time, copyright protection was not 
nearly as expansive as it is today.43  The 1790 Act lacked any provision 
allowing awards of costs or attorney’s fees to a prevailing party.44 
The Copyright Act of 1831 was the first revision permitting plaintiffs to 
recover costs.45  It stated “[t]hat, in all recoveries under [the Act], either for 
damages, forfeitures, or penalties, full costs shall be allowed thereon.”46  This 
language required courts to award costs without giving them discretion.  This 
iteration did not mention attorney’s fees as a possible award.47 
The Copyright Act of 1909, however, added attorney’s fees as another 
recoverable item.48  Leaving the phrase “full costs” untouched, it provided 
“[t]hat in all actions, suits, or proceedings under [the Act], except when 
 
 38. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 39. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 40. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 41. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802). 
 42. Id.  In 1984, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the stated purpose of the 1790 Act. See 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
 43. The 1790 Act provided for an initial copyright term of only fourteen years and limited 
this protection to books, charts, and maps. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. at 124.  
Today, copyright protection is much broader and allows for copyright terms of potentially 
ninety-five years because it extends protection nonexclusively to literary works; musical 
works; dramatic works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; sound recordings; and 
architectural works. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§§ 2.02–.03 (rev. ed. 2018). 
 44. See generally Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
 45. Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 12, 4 Stat. 436, 438–39. 
 46. Id. 
 47. This was not unique to the Copyright Act at this time:  no federal statute permitted 
attorney’s fees from 1800 to 1853. John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee 
Allocation:  The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1576 (1993). 
 48. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 40, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084. 
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brought by or against the United States or any officer thereof, full costs shall 
be allowed, and the court may award to the prevailing party a reasonable 
attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”49  Unlike costs, which remained 
mandatory, attorney’s fees were permissive and awarded at the court’s 
discretion.50 
The modern copyright statute, the Copyright Act of 1976, made the award 
of costs permissive as well.51  Section 505 now provides that costs, like 
attorney’s fees, should be granted at the discretion of the court.52  This was a 
“substantial departure” from the previous Act,53 under which courts routinely 
recognized that an award of full costs was mandatory.54  Under the 1976 Act, 
only the prevailing party may recover attorney’s fees, whereas costs may be 
awarded to either the prevailing party or the losing party where a losing party 
is forced to go to trial after offering to consent to judgment.55 
In short, an award of costs was recognized and made mandatory under the 
1831 Act and remained so for nearly a century and a half until the 1976 Act 
made an award of costs permissive.56 
B.  Awards of Costs 
Costs are distinct from attorney’s fees,57 and fee-shifting statutes often 
draw a distinction between these two items.58  Attorney’s fees are the 
compensation an attorney earns for legal services.59  Costs are the 
expenditures that the attorney pays to third parties to carry out a case.60  The 
extent of these expenditures to third parties that a prevailing party may be 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Quinto v. Legal Times of Wash., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579, 580 (D.D.C. 1981). 
 54. See, e.g., Simon & Flynn, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 513 F.2d 832, 835 (2d Cir. 1975); Edward 
B. Marks Music Corp. v. Foullon, 171 F.2d 905, 908 (2d Cir. 1949); Krafft v. Cohen, 38 F. 
Supp. 1022, 1023 (E.D. Pa. 1941).  But see Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 
1183, 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (ignoring the mandatory fee-shifting provision); Sweet Music, 
Inc. v. Melrose Music Corp., 189 F. Supp. 655, 659 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (same); Harrington v. 
Mure, 186 F. Supp. 655, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (same); Vernon v. Sam S. & Lee Shubert, Inc., 
220 F. 694, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (refusing to award costs where the lawsuit was brought in 
good faith). 
 55. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 877 F.2d 1120, 1128–29 (2d Cir. 
1989) (denying attorney’s fees but affirming costs where a vexatious plaintiff forced a 
defendant to trial after the defendant offered to consent to judgment). 
 56. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 43, § 14.09. 
 57. See, e.g., People v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 196, 199 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(“Attorney fees and the expenses of litigation, whether termed costs, disbursements, outlays, 
or something else, are mutually exclusive.”); Johnson v. Jarvis, 107 So. 3d 428, 429 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2012) (“Costs and attorney’s fees are not one and the same.”). 
 58. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012); 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–285 
(2012). 
 59. Attorney’s Fee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The charge to a client 
for services performed for the client, such as an hourly fee, a flat fee, or a contingent fee.”). 
 60. Cost, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The expenses of litigation, 
prosecution, or other legal transaction, esp[ecially] those allowed in favor of one party against 
the other.”). 
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entitled to recover in copyright infringement cases is a subject of 
controversy.61  Although courts have general authority to award costs to 
prevailing parties, expert witness fees—which are often crucial in copyright 
litigation62—may not be awarded without explicit statutory authorization.63 
1.  Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
“[u]nless a federal statute, [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure], or a court 
order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be 
allowed to the prevailing party.”64  The Supreme Court has noted that the 
language of this Rule codifies a presumption that all prevailing parties are 
entitled to costs.65  Still, the Court made clear that the word “should” suggests 
that, absent statutory authority providing otherwise, awards of costs 
ultimately lie within a trial judge’s discretion.66 
Although the Court has not articulated the exact factors that should permit 
an award of attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in copyright litigation, it has 
made clear that bad faith67 is not the only condition that will permit such 
an award.68  Frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness, 
compensation, and deterrence constitute nonexclusive factors courts may 
consider in deciding whether to award costs and attorney’s fees, so long as 
the award is “faithful to the purposes of the Copyright Act.”69 
2.  Taxable Costs 
“Costs” is a term of art that is not synonymous with expenses.70  Litigants 
incur a variety of expenses throughout the course of litigation—from modest 
sums like filing fees to enormous sums spent for attorneys and expert 
witnesses.71  Still, prevailing parties are not entitled to recover all of these 
expenses.72 
Presumptive awards of costs permitted under Rule 54(d) are those costs 
that Congress has defined as taxable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.73  Section 1920 
provides: 
 
 61. See infra Part III (discussing the circuit split regarding the permissible scope of awards 
of costs under § 505). 
 62. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 63. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 64. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1). 
 65. Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 377 (2013) (holding that 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692k(a)(3) did not displace discretion to award costs under Rule 54(d)(1)). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 68. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 532 n.18 (1994). 
 69. Id. at 534 n.19. 
 70. 10 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 54.103 (Daniel R. Coquillette 
et al. eds., 3d ed. 2018). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441 (1987). 
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A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the 
following: 
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; 
(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily 
obtained for use in the case; 
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; 
(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any 
materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case; 
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; 
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of 
interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation 
services under section 1828 of this title. 
The witness fees described in § 1920(3) are further defined in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1821.74 
The Supreme Court has held that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1821 “define the 
full extent of a federal court’s power to shift litigation costs absent express 
statutory authority to go further.”75  Therefore, absent a statutory provision 
providing otherwise, federal courts generally cannot award additional costs 
beyond those enumerated in § 1920 and § 1821.76  Courts cannot supersede 
the limits these sections impose without “plain evidence of congressional 
intent to supersede those sections.”77 
Expert witnesses, just like any other witnesses, are entitled to the fees 
defined under § 1821.78  However, trained and experienced experts with 
valuable time, talents, and specialized knowledge generally require 
compensation beyond what § 1821 covers.79  Accordingly, a substantial 
majority of expert witness fees accrued by litigants in copyright infringement 
cases are not covered as taxable costs.80 
3.  Expert Witness Fees as Nontaxable Costs 
Nontaxable costs are all other costs not specifically enumerated under 
§ 1920 and § 1821.  Absent “plain evidence of congressional intent to 
supersede [these sections],” courts may not award these costs.81  Nontaxable 
costs can include modest litigation expenses such as “postage, delivery 
services . . . , long distance calls, copy costs, brief binding, copies of 
deposition transcripts, costs of investigation, computerized legal research, 
 
 74. Section 1821 allows for an attendance fee of forty dollars per day for witnesses in U.S. 
courts and further entitles such witnesses to reimbursement for travel and subsistence 
expenses. 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (2012). 
 75. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 86 (1991). 
 76. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 77. Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 445. 
 78. See Horace L. Bomar, Jr., Note, The Compensation of Expert Witnesses, 2 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 510, 510 (1935). 
 79. See id.; infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. 
 80. See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. 
 81. Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 445; see also infra Part I.B.4 (discussing what 
constitutes “plain evidence of congressional intent”). 
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and travel expenses for witnesses.”82  However, nontaxable costs can also 
include more substantial expenses like expert witness fees in copyright 
litigation.83  Like lawyers, expert witnesses charge hourly rates.84  A recent 
survey estimated that the average fee for an expert is $513 per hour for trial 
testimony, $483 per hour for deposition testimony, and $383 per hour for file 
review and case preparation.85  If a prevailing party is not entitled to recover 
nontaxable costs, that party may only be able to recover an expert’s $40 per 
day attendance fee for testifying in a deposition or trial—far less than an 
expert’s total fees.86 
The Federal Circuit has found that absent statutory authority, a prevailing 
party can recover expert witness fees upon a finding of bad faith.87  The 
Supreme Court has reaffirmed that federal courts have inherent power to 
impose sanctions in the form of an award of costs and attorney’s fees to a 
prevailing party in excess of what is provided by statute.88  Such sanctions 
are appropriate “when a party has ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, 
or for oppressive reasons.’”89  This standard is very stringent, and thus is not 
a reliable method for shifting expert witness fees.90  Therefore, without 
sanctionable behavior, statutory authority, or contractual authority, an award 
of expert fees likely will not be included in an award of costs. 
4.  What Is Plain Evidence of Congressional Intent? 
In Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc.,91 the Supreme Court 
explained that although Congress has the power to expand the realm of 
 
 82. Michael Northrup, Restrictions on Class-Action Attorney-Fee Awards, 46 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 953, 965–66 (2005). 
 83. See Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 709 (2003) 
(calling experts the “culprits” for high costs in copyright litigation). 
 84. TERENCE P. ROSS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:  DAMAGES AND REMEDIES § 8.09 
(2011). 
 85. See JAMES J. MANGRAVITI, JR., STEVEN BABITSKY & NADINE NASSER DONOVAN, 2017 
SEAK, INC., SURVEY OF EXPERT WITNESS FEES 2 (2017). 
 86. 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) (2012). 
 87. See, e.g., iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[A] 
court can invoke its inherent power to award [expert] fees in exceptional cases based upon a 
finding of bad faith.”); Takeda Chem. Indus. v. Mylan Labs., 549 F.3d 1381, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (“[A] district court may invoke its inherent power to impose sanctions in the form of 
reasonable expert fees in excess of what is provided for by statute.”); Amsted Indus. v. 
Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 23 F.3d 374, 378 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[A] trial court can invoke its 
inherent sanctioning power to impose expert witness fees in excess of the section 1821(b) 
cap.”); Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“28 U.S.C. § 1821 does not limit 
the amount of expert witness fees included in awards of attorney fees, even in the absence of 
a statute requiring a finding of bad faith or other egregious conduct making a case 
‘exceptional.’”). 
 88. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 42, 50 (1991); ROSS, supra note 84, 
§ 8.09. 
 89. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45–46 (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness 
Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 258–59 (1975)). 
 90. See Jay E. Rosenblum, The Appropriate Standard of Review for a Finding of Bad 
Faith, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1546, 1550–54 (1992). 
 91. 482 U.S. 437 (1987). 
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recoverable costs, it is not presumed to have done so without “explicit 
statutory . . . authorization.”92  Thus, a court may not assess nontaxable costs 
against a losing party unless there is “plain evidence of congressional intent 
to supersede [§ 1920 and § 1821].”93 
In West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey,94 the Supreme Court 
further clarified that neither the term “attorney’s fee” nor the term “costs” 
allows for the shifting of expert fees.95  The statute at issue in West Virginia 
University Hospitals, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, did not contain any provision 
explicitly referring to costs beyond § 1920 and § 1821 at the time the case 
was decided.96  However, just over a week prior to the enactment of § 1988, 
several other statutes were enacted that did explicitly permit fee shifting for 
expert witness fees.97  Every statute referenced in West Virginia University 
Hospitals that was determined to permit the shifting of expert fees 
specifically included the word “expert.”98  Accordingly, the Court found that 
the statute at issue—which lacked similar language before it was later 
amended—did not allow for the recovery of expert witness fees.99 
In Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy,100 the 
Supreme Court revisited this issue in the context of the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act and made clear that the term “reasonable 
attorneys’ fees” also failed to explicitly permit the recovery of expert fees, 
even if legislative history supported permitting recovery.101 
All fee-shifting provisions in the three key federal acts governing patent, 
trademark, and copyright law—enacted in 1790, 1946, and 1976 
respectively—lack express language referring to expert witness fees.102  
However, in the context of trade secrets, an area of intellectual property 
generally governed by state law,103 modern state legislatures have started to 
 
 92. See id. at 445. 
 93. Id. 
 94. 499 U.S. 83 (1991). 
 95. Id. at 87 n.3, 102. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. at 88.  For example, the Toxic Substances Control Act contained provisions 
allowing a prevailing party to recover “costs of suit and reasonable fees for attorneys and 
expert witnesses,” 15 U.S.C. §§ 2618(d), 2619(c)(2) (1988) (emphasis added); the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act allowed shifting the “costs of litigation (including reasonable 
attorney and expert witness fees),” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1988) (emphasis added); and the 
Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act allowed shifting the “costs of suit, including reasonable 
attorney’s fees and reasonable expert witness fees,” 49 U.S.C. app. § 1686(e) (1988) 
(emphasis added).  For a nonexhaustive list of thirty-four statutes that explicitly shift 
attorney’s fees and expert witness fees, see W. Va. Univ. Hosps., 499 U.S. at 89 n.4. 
 98. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., 499 U.S. at 89 n.4. 
 99. Id. at 102.  After West Virginia University Hospitals, § 1988(c) was amended to 
provide that “[i]n awarding an attorney’s fee . . . , the court, in its discretion, may include 
expert fees as part of the attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (2012). 
 100. 548 U.S. 291 (2006). 
 101. See id. at 304. 
 102. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
 103. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001–04 (1984).  In certain 
circumstances, trade secret protection is provided by federal statutes. See, e.g., Freedom of 
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expressly allow for the recovery of costs to include expert witness fees where 
there is bad faith in trade secret misappropriation claims.104  Still, these 
statutes merely mirror existing federal doctrine allowing for an award of 
expert fees where a party has engaged in sanctionable behavior.105 
C.  “Full Costs” 
Don’t use words too big for the subject.  Don’t say “infinitely” when you 
mean “very”; otherwise you’ll have no word left when you want to talk 
about something really infinite. 
—C. S. Lewis106 
Unlike the other intellectual property acts, § 505 of the Copyright Act 
ambiguously allows courts to award “full costs.”107  Although this language 
is rare in the context of federal fee shifting, it has been used elsewhere in the 
U.S. Code. 
1.  Ambiguity in 17 U.S.C. § 505 
Despite the Supreme Court’s seemingly straightforward holdings in 
Crawford Fitting, West Virginia University Hospitals, and Murphy,108 the 
language of § 505 has continuously led to disparate results among the circuit 
courts of appeals.109  One view is that interpreting § 505 as limiting costs to 
taxable costs will “read[] the word ‘full’ out of the statute.”110  Accordingly, 
nontaxable costs that lie outside the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1920 may be 
awarded to avoid “mak[ing] surplusage of any provision.”111  Still, there is a 
strong argument that § 505’s lack of any clear reference to expert witness 
fees or other nontaxable costs simply does not constitute clear congressional 
intent to treat § 505 costs differently from those in other statutes.112 
 
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2012); Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–
1832 (2012); Trade Secret Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2012). 
 104. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.4 (2019); N.J. STAT. § 56:15-6 (2018).  For example, 
section 3426.4 of the California Civil Code provides: 
If a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith, a motion to terminate an 
injunction is made or resisted in bad faith, or willful and malicious misappropriation 
exists, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing 
party.  Recoverable costs hereunder shall include a reasonable sum to cover the 
services of expert witnesses, who are not regular employees of any party, actually 
incurred and reasonably necessary in either, or both, preparation for trial or 
arbitration, or during trial or arbitration, of the case by the prevailing party. 
 105. See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. 
 106. Letter from C. S. Lewis to Joan (June 26, 1926), in C. S. LEWIS, LETTERS TO CHILDREN 
63, 64 (Lyle W. Dorsett & Marjorie Lamp Mead eds., 1985). 
 107. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012); see also infra Part I.D. 
 108. See supra Part I.B.4. 
 109. See infra Part III; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 110. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm’t Distrib., 429 F.3d 869, 885 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Artisan Contractors Ass’n of Am. v. Frontier Ins. Co., 275 F.3d 1038, 1040 (11th 
Cir. 2001). 
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2.  Federal Fee-Shifting Provisions That Allow “Full Costs” 
The phrase “full costs” is not unique to § 505.  The phrase also appears in 
17 U.S.C. § 911(f), 28 U.S.C. § 4001(g), and 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(c)(2)(C) and 
605(e)(3)—each a fee-shifting provision that allows for the recovery of full 
costs within its statutory framework.113  Unfortunately, courts have not had 
occasion to interpret whether 17 U.S.C. § 911(f)114 or 28 U.S.C. § 4001(g)115 
provide for nontaxable costs beyond the taxable costs that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 
and 1821 permit.116  Courts have, however, interpreted 47 U.S.C. 
§§ 553(c)(2)(C) and 605(e)(3). 
47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(2)(C)—which applies to disputes involving the 
unauthorized reception of cable service—provides that courts may “direct the 
recovery of full costs, including awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees to an 
aggrieved party who prevails.”  Courts have found that full costs in these 
cases can include investigative costs117—costs beyond what 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1920 contemplates.118  Investigative costs have been awarded to a 
prevailing party under this statute where the plaintiffs were forced to incur a 
substantial cost to hire an investigative agency to stop a debtor from causing 
harm, which was itself an injury.119 
47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)—which applies to disputes involving unauthorized 
publication or use of communications—provides that when a person 
aggrieved by a violation of subsection (a) of the statute brings a civil action, 
the court “shall direct the recovery of full costs, including awarding 
reasonable attorneys’ fees to an aggrieved party who prevails.”  Like 
47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(2)(C), courts have discretion to allow for recovery of 
 
 113. 17 U.S.C. § 911(f) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 4001(g) (2012); 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(c)(2)(C), 
605(e)(3) (2012). 
 114. 17 U.S.C. § 911(f) provides that “[i]n any civil action arising under . . . chapter [9], 
the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs, including reasonable attorneys’ 
fees, to the prevailing party” in disputes involving mask work fixed in semiconductor chip 
products.  The Federal Circuit found this section to be “commensurate with 17 U.S.C. § 505 
of the copyright statute.” Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 
1582 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 115. 28 U.S.C. § 4001(g) provides that “the court in its discretion may allow the recovery 
of full costs by or against any party and may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the 
prevailing party as part of the costs” in disputes arising from contractual obligations related to 
transfers of rights in motion pictures. 
 116. As of February 5, 2019, research has not identified any cases discussing the “full 
costs” language in these statutes. 
 117. See, e.g., CSC Holdings, Inc. v. KDE Elecs. Corp., No. 99 C 1556, 2000 WL 284005, 
at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2000); Time Warner Entm’t/Advance-Newhouse P’ship v. Worldwide 
Elecs., L.C., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1302 (S.D. Fla. 1999).  Interestingly, the decision in CSC 
Holdings was based on precedent developed before the Supreme Court’s mandate in Crawford 
Fitting, which requires explicit statutory authority to permit costs beyond those enumerated in 
28 U.S.C. § 1920. See CSC Holdings, 2000 WL 284005, at *6 (relying on Time Warner for 
the proposition that full costs may include investigative costs); Time Warner, 50 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1302 (relying on In re Cohen, 121 B.R. 267, 269 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990) for the proposition 
that full costs may include investigative costs). 
 118. See supra notes 73–74. 
 119. In re Cohen, 121 B.R. 267, 272 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990). 
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investigative costs.120  One court held that the legislative history of the 
underlying statute provides the basis for allowing recovery of investigative 
fees by confirming that a court’s “power to direct the recovery of all costs 
under § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii) shall include reasonable investigative fees (related 
to the action) of an aggrieved party.”121 
D.  Fee Shifting in Other Areas of Intellectual Property Law 
The Lanham Act—also known as the Trademark Act of 1946—governs 
trademarks, service marks, and unfair competition.122  The Lanham Act’s 
fee-shifting provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), provides that “[w]hen a violation 
of any right of the registrant of a mark . . . shall have been established in any 
civil action arising under [the Act], the plaintiff shall be entitled . . . to 
recover . . . the costs of the action.”123  Although costs are mandatory under 
the Lanham Act,124 they are only awarded to prevailing plaintiffs and are 
limited to costs defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.125  Section 1117(a) does not 
expressly mention the shifting of expert fees,126 and the Second Circuit has 
noted in dicta that expert witness fees are not included in an award of costs 
under the Lanham Act.127 
The Patent Act governs patents and the rights associated with them.128  The 
Patent Act’s fee-shifting provision for costs, 35 U.S.C. § 284, provides that 
“the court shall award the claimant damages . . . together with interest and 
costs as fixed by the court.”129  Like the Lanham Act, costs are only awarded 
to prevailing plaintiffs, and these costs are limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1920.130  
 
 120. See, e.g., Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v. Autar, 426 F. Supp. 2d 59, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006) (finding that § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii) implies that reasonable attorneys’ fees are included in 
full costs, which suggests that full costs may exceed the taxable costs recoverable under 
28 U.S.C. § 1920); Int’l Cablevision, Inc. v. Noel, 982 F. Supp. 904, 918 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(noting that the legislative history of the Cable Communications Policy Act contemplates and 
permits the recovery of reasonable investigative fees in the recovery of all costs).  Even though 
awarding full costs is mandatory under § 605(e)(3), the legislative history of this statute 
instructs courts that awarding investigative fees is permissive. See Kingvision, 426 F. Supp. 2d 
at 67. 
 121. Int’l Cablevision, 982 F. Supp. at 917. 
 122. See generally Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072, 1091–1096, 1111–1129, 1141–1141n (2012)). 
 123. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012). 
 124. See Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1977 (2016) (“When 
a statute distinguishes between ‘may’ and ‘shall,’ it is generally clear that ‘shall’ imposes a 
mandatory duty.”). 
 125. See, e.g., Uphoff v. Elegant Bath, Ltd., 176 F.3d 399, 411 (7th Cir. 1999); Zeltiq 
Aesthetics, Inc. v. Brown Health Relaxation Station LLC, No. 13-C-575, 2014 WL 1818154, 
at *5 (E.D. Wis. May 6, 2014). 
 126. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). 
 127. Merck Eprova AG v. Gnosis S.p.A., 760 F.3d 247, 266 (2d Cir. 2014) (explaining that 
the district court clearly exceeded its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1821 by awarding expert 
witness fees). 
 128. See generally Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 1–42, 100–212, 251–329, 351–376, 381–390 (2012)). 
 129. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
 130. See Parks v. Booth, 102 U.S. 96, 106 (1880). 
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Further, such costs are mandatory.131  Section 284 also does not expressly 
mention shifting expert fees.132  In light of this, courts have uniformly held 
that the Patent Act does not authorize the prevailing party in a patent suit to 
recover its expert witness fees.133 
Accordingly, both the Lanham Act and Patent Act differ from the 
Copyright Act regarding fee shifting.  First, neither act allows prevailing 
defendants to recover costs, whereas the Copyright Act allows for fee shifting 
regardless of which side prevails.134  Second, both the Lanham and Patent 
Acts use mandatory language regarding fee shifting of costs, whereas the 
Copyright Act does not.135  Third, neither the Lanham Act nor the Patent Act 
authorizes a prevailing party to recover its expert witness fees, which stands 
in contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the Copyright Act that a 
prevailing party may recover its expert witness fees.136 
II.  AMBIGUOUS COPYRIGHT LAW AND POTENTIAL REMEDIES 
The 1976 Act contains several ambiguous provisions that present 
challenges for potential copyright infringement litigants.  Although these 
challenges may increase the cost of undertaking successful copyright 
litigation, there are potential remedies that allow litigants to circumvent these 
challenges.  Part II.A discusses the ambiguity of the Copyright Act and the 
inherent need for experts in copyright litigation.  Part II.B examines some 
alternative remedies for costly copyright litigation. 
A.  Understanding the Copyright Act 
Copyright law considers a copyright owner’s reward to be a “secondary 
consideration” to the benefits the public gleans from that author’s work.137  
Allowing copyright holders to exclude others from producing or selling a 
holder’s work allows the public to benefit from the work.138  Rewarding 
authors in such a way induces them to release their work to the public.139  To 
effectuate this incentive, copyright law has been shaped to comply with a 
wide range of complex fact patterns so that courts may reach equitable 
results.140 
 
 131. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 132. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
 133. See, e.g., Genes Indus. v. Custom Blinds & Components, Inc., No. SACV 15-0476 
AG (Ex), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21879, at *20 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2018); BIC Leisure Prods. 
v. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 224, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 134. See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 136. See infra notes 201–02 and accompanying text. 
 137. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 
116 YALE L.J. 882, 885 (2007). 
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1.  Copyright Law Is Ambiguous 
To address a variety of complex fact patterns, copyright doctrines are 
inherently ambiguous.141  Copyright’s fair use defense, for example, which 
requires the application of four interdependent and nonexclusive factors,142 
is “famously ambiguous” with over a century and a half of case law having 
analyzed it.143  Further, although copyright protects an author’s expression, 
more abstract ideas remain uncopyrightable, and the dividing line between 
these two concepts is murky.144  The “substantial similarity” standard, which 
permits copying in certain contexts, does not provide a clear threshold for 
what comprises excessive copying.145 
In light of these ambiguous doctrines, the risk of misinterpreting what 
copyright does and does not protect can be substantial.146  New creative 
works may require significant investment up front with no profit until 
completion of the work.147  An error leading to copyright liability could delay 
or destroy that entire investment.148  Accordingly, decision makers are 
encouraged to be more risk averse.149  The more money involved in a project, 
the greater the need for prophylactic measures, which have their own 
costs.150 
2.  Expert Testimony Is Often Vital in Copyright Litigation 
Intellectual property litigation can become expensive.151  Expert witnesses 
are typically required to explain complex concepts such as consumer surveys 
and the likelihood of confusion in trademark cases, relevant technologies in 
patent cases, and issues of substantial similarity in copyright cases.152  
Although copyright cases concerning publishing and entertainment can often 
be resolved without experts, battles of experts have become increasingly 
more common as copyright litigation spreads to computers and 
multimedia.153 
Recently, in Williams v. Gaye,154 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict 
finding that Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke’s song “Blurred Lines” 
unlawfully infringed on Marvin Gaye’s copyright to the song “Got to Give It 
 
 141. See generally id. (describing various copyright doctrines that lead to ambiguity within 
copyright law). 
 142. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 143. Gibson, supra note 140, at 889–90. 
 144. See id. at 891. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 890. 
 147. Id. at 891. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. at 892. 
 150. See id. at 892–93. 
 151. 4 JAY DRATLER, JR. & STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:  
COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE, AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 12.06 n.166 (2013). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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Up.”155  Expert witnesses played a significant role in securing the verdict for 
Marvin Gaye’s estate.156  Judge Jacqueline Nguyen dissented and seemed to 
suggest that where a court has little expertise on a subject and the opposing 
parties’ experts’ opinions are so “starkly different,” a court should ignore the 
parties’ experts and instead appoint its own.157  Regardless of the propriety 
of Judge Nguyen’s suggestion, this case illustrates the significant role that 
expert witnesses play in copyright infringement cases. 
In Fox News Network v. TVEyes, Inc.,158 the Second Circuit, too, recently 
demonstrated the significant role expert testimony can play in determining 
whether an infringement has taken place.159  The court’s consideration of 
market harm—arguably “the single most important element of fair use”160—
played a critical role in securing a verdict for Fox.161 
Moreover, after attorney’s fees, expert witness fees are the second-highest 
expense in intellectual property litigation.162  However, no federal 
intellectual property legislation explicitly grants courts the authority to shift 
expert fees.163  Nonetheless, expert fees contribute enormously to litigation 
costs, which in turn inform settlement decisions.164  Direct proof of copying 
is generally not available, so plaintiffs are often required to utilize expert 
testimony to establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement.165  
Further, expert testimony may also be crucial to establish actual damages and 
recoverable profits.166  Barring recovery of expert fees may disincentivize 
plaintiffs from protecting their copyrights, especially as the costs approach 
the threshold of potential recovery.167  Defendants, too, may be strong-armed 
into settlement to avoid the expert fees required to rebut a plaintiff’s prima 
facie case.168 
The need for expert testimony to determine whether actual copying has 
taken place can arise in several situations.  For example, expert testimony 
can greatly assist a lay juror in understanding what elements of a song are 
 
 155. Id. at 1182–83. 
 156. See id. at 1187–94 (Nguyen, J., dissenting).  The experts articulated the alleged 
similarities in melody, shared hook phrases, a four-note melodic sequence called “Theme X,” 
word painting, and similar chords and rhythms among the keyboard parts and bass line. Id. 
 157. See id. at 1197 n.15 (pointing to Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which 
allows courts to appoint their own experts). 
 158. 883 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 159. Id. at 179–80. 
 160. Id. at 179 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
566 (1985)). 
 161. See id. at 180. 
 162. Anne Brody & Natalie Dygert, Shifting Expert Fees in Intellectual Property 
Litigation, 18 ASS’N BUS. TRIAL LAW. REP. ORANGE COUNTY, Summer 2016, at 3, 3. 
 163. See supra Part I.D.  Even the more recent Defend Trade Secrets Act, enacted in 2016, 
does not mention expert fees. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3) (Supp. V 2018). 
 164. Brody & Dygert, supra note 162, at 11. 
 165. Trigg, Brock & Pequignot, supra note 5, at 13. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See id. 
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sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection.169  Expert testimony 
may be a necessity in cases involving complex computer programs, which 
are generally beyond the everyday knowledge of a lay juror.170  Another 
example is the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act,171 where the Senate 
report stressed the importance of using expert testimony in determining 
substantial similarity.172  This reliance on expert testimony constitutes a 
significant shift from conventional copyright law.173  Still, several courts 
have made clear that expert testimony was not appropriate in certain 
contexts.174 
Nonetheless, since the enactment of the 1976 Act, expert testimony has 
become increasingly useful in copyright infringement cases in potentially 
unforeseen ways.  The concept of “works of authorship”—which allows 
courts to protect works not expressly included in the enumerated categories 
of copyrightable works under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)175—was intentionally left 
vague under the 1976 Act.176  The scope of works covered by copyright law 
has continued to expand into new domains, such as computers and 
multimedia,177 thus increasing the requirement for experts.178 
 
 169. Miah Rosenberg, Note, Do You Hear What I Hear?  Expert Testimony in Music 
Infringement Cases in the Ninth Circuit, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1669, 1682 (2006). 
 170. Aaron M. Broaddus, Eliminating the Confusion:  A Restatement of the Test for 
Copyright Infringement, 5 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 43, 67 n.144 (1995). 
 171. Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335 (1984) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901–
914 (2012)). 
 172. See S. REP. NO. 98-1201, at 145–46 (1983) (“I . . . hope that the legislative history of 
S. 1201 would include a statement endorsing use of expert testimony to show subtle functional 
differences in circuit layouts.”); Richard H. Stern, Determining Liability for Infringement of 
Mask Work Rights Under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 70 MINN. L. REV. 271, 300 
(1985). 
 173. Stern, supra note 172, at 300 n.98. 
 174. See, e.g., Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 295 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that expert testimony was not needed to compare two literary works aimed at a general 
audience to determine substantial similarity); Soptra Fabrics Corp. v. Stafford Knitting Mills, 
Inc., 490 F.2d 1092, 1093 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that the underlying test for infringement of 
fabric design is “whether an average lay observer would find a substantial similarity in the 
designs” (quoting Concord Fabrics, Inc. v. Marcus Bros. Textile Corp., 409 F.2d 1315, 1316 
(2d Cir. 1969))); Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 989 F. Supp. 2d 96, 103–04 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(holding that no expert testimony is needed to determine whether architectural works are 
substantially similar). 
 175. Under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), works of authorship include “(1) literary works; (2) musical 
works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying 
music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; 
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural 
works.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 176. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976) (“The phrase ‘original works of authorship[]’ . . . 
is purposely left undefined.”). 
 177. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 178. See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(“[W]e leave it to the discretion of the district court to decide to what extent, if any, expert 
opinion, regarding the highly technical nature of computer programs, is warranted in a given 
case.”); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232–33 (3d Cir. 
1986) (endorsing the use of expert testimony for determining copyright infringement of 
computer software). 
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B.  Current Remedies for Costly Copyright Litigation 
Apart from shifting expert fees, there are several alternate methods that 
help circumvent the daunting prospect of costly copyright litigation, 
including settlement, offers of judgment under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
In general, civil cases rarely reach a stage where judgment is entered 
against a party.179  In copyright cases, however, judgments entered against a 
party are comparatively more common.180  Nonetheless, ambiguity in 
copyright law can generate risk-averse behavior that motivates settlement.181  
Where there are hazy legal situations, settlements allow parties to protect 
themselves from a copyright owner who may obtain a judgment granting 
himself all available remedies.182  Because copyright disputes may be well 
suited for nonlitigation dispute resolution due to parties’ interests in avoiding 
uncertain and costly copyright litigation, a culture of settlement may be 
developing within the copyright arena.183  Such a culture can foster a chilling 
effect184 among copyright users because they may be subject to costs they 
could have avoided if the matter had been litigated.185  Thus, dispute 
settlement essentially can raise the costs of using copyrighted works and 
create an incentive to pay for a use of work when there is no legal obligation 
to do so.186 
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure helps defendants reduce 
potential fee exposure for frivolous claims that plaintiffs bring.187  To 
accomplish this, it provides a mechanism to help defendants encourage 
settlement.  Under Rule 68(d), “[i]f the judgment that the offeree finally 
obtains is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay 
 
 179. From January 1, 2009, to January 1, 2019, statistics show that a judgment is entered 
for a plaintiff or defendant in roughly 9 percent of total district court cases. Statistics 
Regarding Case Resolutions, LEX MACHINA, https://law.lexmachina.com (follow “Cases” 
hyperlink; then select “Case Resolutions” tab).  More specifically, judgment was entered for 
a plaintiff 5 percent of the time, and judgment was entered for a defendant 4 percent of the 
time. Id. 
 180. From January 1, 2009, to January 1, 2019, statistics show that in roughly 13 percent 
of copyright cases (and intellectual property in general), judgment was entered for a plaintiff 
or defendant. Id. (follow “Cases” hyperlink; then under “Filter” select “Case Types” 
dropdown menu and select “Copyright”; then select “Case Resolutions” tab).  More 
specifically, judgment was entered for a plaintiff roughly 12 percent of the time, and judgment 
was entered for a defendant roughly 1 percent of the time. Id. 
 181. Orit Fischman Afori, Flexible Remedies as a Means to Counteract Failures in 
Copyright Law, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 17 (2011). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 18 & n.74. 
 184. A chilling effect results where “potential uses of copyrighted works are avoided 
because of the lack of clarity regarding the legal status of the uses in question.” Id. at 5. 
 185. Id. at 18. 
 186. Id. at 45. 
 187. See, e.g., McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ., LLC v. Jones, 714 F. App’x 500, 504 (6th Cir. 
2017) (recognizing that Rule 68 allows a defendant to make a nonnegotiable offer of judgment 
consisting of costs and attorney’s fees). 
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the costs incurred after the offer was made.”188  So long as the offer does not 
explicitly exclude costs, Rule 68 allows defendants to make a nonnegotiable 
offer of judgment.189  Unlike standard settlement negotiations where a 
plaintiff may provide a counteroffer, plaintiffs faced with a Rule 68 offer may 
only accept or decline the offer.190  Rule 68 thus provides a neutral means 
for encouraging settlement of all lawsuits without favoring either party.191 
Where liability is settled but damages have yet to be calculated, a 
mandatory grant of costs and fees may deter defendants from fighting 
plaintiffs who demand unreasonable damages.192  Rule 68 provides this 
mandatory award of costs and fees.  Granting mandatory costs and fees also 
can allow defendants to ward off claims by copyright holders seeking 
damages not recognized by law.193  To draw attention to the neutral benefits 
of Rule 68 for encouraging settlement, one commentator has suggested 
adding a provision to § 505 that states that neither party is prevailing when 
the judgment the plaintiff ultimately obtains is not more favorable than the 
unaccepted offer.194 
Under Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, sanctions are 
authorized where it is determined that a claim has an insufficient legal or 
factual basis or it is brought for an improper purpose.195  Rule 11 sanctions 
thus provide a procedural tactic to help combat baseless and frivolous 
copyright litigation.  In Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications 
Enterprises,196 the Supreme Court upheld Rule 11 sanctions and made clear 
“that the central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in district court 
and thus . . . streamline the administration and procedure of the federal 
courts.”197  Therefore, Rule 11 sanctions potentially offer another avenue for 
a prevailing party to recover expert witness fees outside of § 505.198 
III.  DIVERGING INTERPRETATIONS OF “FULL COSTS” 
The circuit courts are in conflict regarding the scope of costs that may be 
awarded to prevailing parties under § 505.199  Whether expert witness fees 
 
 188. FED. R. CIV. P. 68(d). 
 189. Util. Automation 2000, Inc. v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., 298 F.3d 1238, 1240 
(11th Cir. 2002). 
 190. Id. 
 191. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985). 
 192. John Tehranian, Curbing Copyblight, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 993, 1024 n.216 
(2012). 
 193. See id. at 1023–24. 
 194. Id. at 1031 (proposing an amended version of § 505 to add that “when a defendant 
makes an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 and the plaintiff rejects 
said offer of judgment and ultimately receives a judgment not more favorable than the 
unaccepted offer of judgment, no party will be considered prevailing”). 
 195. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)–(c). 
 196. 498 U.S. 533 (1991). 
 197. Id. at 552 (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990)). 
 198. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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are recoverable as full costs implicates several of the copyright law issues 
discussed in Part II. 
Fee shifting can have significant consequences when courts are given wide 
discretion when awarding costs to a prevailing party.  In a recent case, Oracle 
USA, Inc. v. Rimini Street, Inc.,200 the judgment awarded to the prevailing 
party included an additional $12 million in costs because it was brought in a 
circuit that awards nontaxable costs beyond those enumerated in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1920.201  These nontaxable costs included expert witness fees, certain 
e-discovery fees, contract-attorney services, and jury consulting, among 
other costs.202  Thus, the level of discretion a court has to award costs can be 
the difference between a party recovering nontaxable costs in the tens of 
millions of dollars or no nontaxable costs at all. 
The circuit courts are divided on whether the Copyright Act’s allowance 
for recovery of “full costs” overrides the restriction on cost awards that 
§ 1920 and § 1821 provide.  The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have found 
§ 505 to be limited to the categories expressly identified in § 1920.203  In 
contrast, the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have awarded 
nontaxable costs in copyright cases.204  Through Crawford Fitting, West 
Virginia University Hospitals, and Murphy, the Supreme Court has 
consistently narrowed the language that allows awards of costs beyond 
§ 1920 and § 1821,205 yet the Court has not addressed whether the language 
“full costs” also fails to permit an award of expert fees.206 
 
 200. 879 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 201. See id. at 965–66.  The District Court of Nevada awarded attorney’s fees and costs in 
favor of Oracle USA in the amount of $46,227,363.36. Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., 
209 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1219 (D. Nev. 2016), aff’d, 879 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 
139 S. Ct. 52 (argued Jan. 14, 2019) (No. 17-1625).  Of the award, $12,774,550.26 constituted 
nontaxable costs. Id. 
 202. Oracle USA, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 1218. 
 203. See Artisan Contractors Ass’n of Am. v. Frontier Ins. Co., 275 F.3d 1038, 1040 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting that “Section 505 makes no clear reference to witness fees, 
nor otherwise evinces a clear congressional intent to supercede [sic] the limitations imposed” 
by Congress’s cost-shifting regime); Pinkham v. Camex, Inc., 84 F.3d 292, 295 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(per curiam) (holding that “full costs” does not “‘clearly,’ ‘explicitly,’ or ‘plainly’ evidence[] 
congressional intent to treat 17 U.S.C. § 505 costs differently from costs authorized in other 
statutes”). 
 204. See Oracle USA, 879 F.3d at 966 (affirming an award for over $12 million in 
nontaxable costs); InvesSys, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 369 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(holding that costs of electronic legal research are reimbursable under § 505); Coles v. 
Wonder, 283 F.3d 798, 803–04 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming an award of over $14,000 in 
nontaxable costs); Susan Wakeen Doll Co. v. Ashton-Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 458 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (holding that an award of nontaxable costs is permissible under § 505 and that 
§ 1920 does not limit the award). 
 205. See supra Part I.B.4. 
 206. The Supreme Court recently granted a writ of certiorari in the Oracle USA case. 
Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 52 (Sept. 27, 2018) (No. 17-1625).  The 
issue on review is “[w]hether the Copyright Act’s allowance of ‘full costs’ (17 U.S.C. § 505) 
to a prevailing party is limited to taxable costs under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1821, as the 
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have held, or also authorizes nontaxable costs, as the Ninth 
Circuit holds.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Rimini Street, 139 S. Ct. 52 (Sept. 27, 2018) 
(No. 17-1625). 
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Circuit courts that have not awarded nontaxable costs under § 505 have 
found that the word “full” does not expressly authorize such costs.207  Under 
Crawford Fitting and its progeny, these courts have determined that the “full 
costs” language does not evince congressional intent to treat § 505 costs 
differently from other costs, especially absent legislative authority discussing 
the source of the term “full costs.”208  Instead, “full costs” may be viewed as 
an indication that any taxable costs available under federal law are available 
in full at the discretion of the court.209  Thus, the term’s ambiguity may not 
establish clear evidence of congressional intent to supersede § 1920 and 
§ 1821.210 
Circuit courts that have awarded nontaxable costs under § 505 have found 
that the word “full” does constitute congressional intent to make nontaxable 
costs available to prevailing parties.211  Under this view, to hold otherwise 
may “violate the long standing principle of statute interpretation that ‘statutes 
should not be construed to make surplusage of any provision.’”212  Thus, 
failing to award costs beyond the limitations of § 1920 and § 1821 would 
render the word “full” meaningless.213  Further, certain nontaxable costs that 
are considered disbursements made by an attorney and billed directly to the 
client, such as computer-assisted research, may be encompassed by the 
phrase “attorney’s fee.”214 
Allowing nontaxable costs to be awarded in copyright cases constitutes 
substantial fee shifting, with awards of nontaxable costs potentially reaching 
tens of millions of dollars.215  Thus, litigants in circuits that do not award 
nontaxable costs avoid the threat of these considerable cost awards in 
copyright cases. 
 
 207. See, e.g., Artisan Contractors, 275 F.3d at 1040; Pinkham, 84 F.3d at 295. 
 208. See Pinkham, 84 F.3d at 295. 
 209. Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 3d 503, 
525 (E.D. Va. 2015) (“Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s presupposition, the term ‘full’ has 
another possible, non-superfluous meaning; it could refer to the degree of costs recoverable 
under §§ 1821 and 1920.”). 
 210. Id. 
 211. See, e.g., Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., 879 F.3d 948, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2018), 
cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 52 (argued Jan. 14, 2019) (No. 17-1625); InvesSys, Inc. v. McGraw-
Hill Cos., 369 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 212. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm’t Distrib., 429 F.3d 869, 885 (9th Cir. 
2005) (quoting Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 834 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 213. Id.  But see Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 385 (2013) (“[R]edundancy 
is ‘hardly unusual’ in statutes addressing costs.” (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 
564 U.S. 91, 107 (2011))). 
 214. InvesSys, 369 F.3d at 22 (citing W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 87 
n.3 (1991)). 
 215. See, e.g., Oracle USA, 879 F.3d at 966 (awarding over $12 million in nontaxable 
costs); Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., No. CV 04-9049 DOC (RNBx), 2011 WL 3420603, 
at *9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2011) (awarding $31,667,104 in nontaxable costs), aff’d, 705 F.3d 
1108 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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IV.  SECTION 505 DOES NOT ALLOW FEE SHIFTING OF 
EXPERT WITNESS FEES, BUT IT SHOULD 
This Note argues that expert fees should be awarded to prevailing parties 
in copyright litigation at the discretion of the court.  First, Part IV.A 
concludes that the current language of 17 U.S.C. § 505 does not allow for the 
shifting of expert fees to prevailing parties.  Next, Part IV.B argues that 
Congress nonetheless should amend § 505 to allow for awards of expert fees 
given the inherent need for experts in copyright litigation. 
Giving courts discretion to award expert fees in copyright infringement 
cases is beneficial to both copyright holders and users.  Without this 
discretion, potential copyright litigants will be deterred from litigating 
meritorious copyright claims and defenses.  This would harm a central 
objective of copyright law—to protect not only the rights of creators, but also 
the public’s access to creative works.216  Thus, allowing for recovery of 
expert fees in appropriate cases will address this concern in cases with 
ambiguous facts and law. 
A.  Section 505 Does Not Allow for Shifting of Expert Fees 
On its face, § 505 does not expressly allow for courts to shift nontaxable 
costs beyond § 1920 and § 1821.  If Congress seeks to encourage the shifting 
of expert witness fees in particular, the Supreme Court’s holdings in 
Crawford Fitting, West Virginia University Hospitals, and Murphy illustrate 
exactly what is required—the word “expert.”217  Section 505 lacks this 
word.218 
As the Supreme Court pointed out in West Virginia University Hospitals, 
Congress passed several acts and amendments in 1976 that included fee-
shifting provisions expressly referring to expert fees.219  That same Congress 
passed the Copyright Act of 1976, and it was capable of using similar 
language in § 505.220  The 1976 Act generally amended the entirety of the 
Copyright Act of 1909,221 and it included several significant revisions to 
§ 505.222  Namely, the 1976 Act made an award of costs to the prevailing 
party no longer mandatory, and it instead provided that they should be 
granted at the discretion of the court.223  However, expert fees were never 
mentioned.224 
 
 216. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra Part I.B.4 (discussing the type of language that will evince clear 
congressional intent to supersede § 1920 and § 1821). 
 218. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012). 
 219. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 220. However, possibly due to unforeseen changes in copyright law, Congress at that time 
may have been unaware of a growing need for experts in copyright infringement litigation. 
See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 221. See generally Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)). 
 222. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 223. See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text. 
 224. See generally Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541. 
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There is evidence that courts shift costs beyond § 1920 and § 1821 under 
statutes that use the language “full costs.”225  However, these statutes hardly 
provide substantial authority that “full costs” meets the requisite explicit 
statutory authorization for allowing the shifting of expert fees that Crawford 
Fitting, West Virginia University Hospitals, and Murphy contemplate.  First, 
the appellate cases that interpret these statutes do not reference any of these 
Supreme Court decisions in deciding whether the language “full costs” 
allows for nontaxable costs beyond § 1920 and § 1821.226  Second, the ranges 
of costs these statutes permit were never contemplated beyond the trial court 
level.227 
Third, the logic allowing for nontaxable costs in these cases is shaky.  For 
example, one case relies on a line of precedent predating the Supreme Court’s 
mandate in Crawford Fitting, which required explicit statutory authority for 
the recovery of costs beyond § 1920 and § 1821.228  Another case based its 
interpretation on two theories:  that the term “full costs” in 47 U.S.C. § 605 
includes reasonable attorneys’ fees in context, and that legislative history 
suggests it was the intent of one senator that parties be able to recover 
reasonable investigative fees in their recovery of costs.229 
However, these two rationales directly contravene Supreme Court 
precedent.  Murphy explained that where a “reasonable attorney’s fee” was 
part of the costs permitted to be shifted, this still did not permit courts to shift 
costs beyond § 1920 and § 1821, even if legislative history may have 
provided some notice that such nontaxable costs were permitted.230  Another 
case failed to reference Crawford Fitting or West Virginia University 
Hospitals in guiding whether an award of investigative fees was permissible, 
despite being decided several years after these two Supreme Court 
decisions.231 
B.  Congress Should Amend § 505 to Allow for Shifting of Expert Fees 
The need for experts in copyright litigation,232 coupled with the exorbitant 
costs of expert testimony that may be required to establish or rebut a prima 
facie case of infringement,233 justify a fee-shifting statute under the 
 
 225. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 226. See generally Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v. Autar, 426 F. Supp. 2d 59 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006) (discussing 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)); CSC Holdings, Inc. v. KDE Elecs. Corp., No. 99 C 
1556, 2000 WL 284005 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2000) (discussing 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(2)(C)); Time 
Warner Entm’t/Advance-Newhouse P’ship v. Worldwide Elecs., L.C., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1288 
(S.D. Fla. 1999) (discussing 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(2)(C)); Int’l Cablevision, Inc. v. Noel, 982 F. 
Supp. 904 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)). 
 227. As of February 5, 2019, research has not identified any appellate cases discussing 
these statutes. 
 228. See supra note 117. 
 229. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text. 
 230. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 231. See generally Int’l Cablevision, 982 F. Supp. 904 (failing to cite relevant Supreme 
Court precedent). 
 232. See supra notes 165–74 and accompanying text. 
 233. See supra notes 84–86, 162, 165, 168 and accompanying text. 
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Copyright Act that permits courts to award expert fees to a prevailing party 
in the court’s discretion. 
Since § 505 was last amended in 1976, the range of works deemed 
copyrightable has grown, which in turn has led to an increased use of 
experts.234  In many cases, expert testimony is the primary tool for 
determining whether copying has taken place at all.235  Without it, plaintiffs 
may not be able to establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement.236  
Where the costs of litigation can substantially outweigh potential 
damages,237 plaintiffs will be precluded from bringing meritorious copyright 
claims without the possibility of recovering these exorbitant costs.  Similarly, 
defendants may be precluded from bringing meritorious defenses where 
substantial litigation costs involving experts outweigh continued use of the 
allegedly copied authorship.  Although Rule 68 may provide a mechanism 
for encouraging settlement so that defendants can avoid fighting demands for 
unreasonable damages, it is unclear how effective Rule 68 is when liability, 
rather than damages, has yet to be determined.238  Accordingly, the 
possibility of recovering expert costs removes a substantial barrier that may 
prevent litigants from bringing meritorious claims or defenses.239  This helps 
to avoid a culture of settlement that discourages copyright users from 
litigating potentially meritorious claims so they are not burdened by 
avoidable costs.240 
Although federal courts already shift expert fees in cases where the 
opposing litigant has “acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons,”241 the needs of copyright litigants call for a broader 
allowance of expert fee shifting.242  Copyright law must balance a creator’s 
property rights and the public’s access to a work, and allowing a litigant’s 
capacity to afford experts to dictate whether they may successfully bring 
meritorious claims or defenses would upset this balance.243  Meritorious 
copyright claims protect not only the litigant bringing those claims but also 
the public’s access to knowledge.244  Accordingly, meritorious copyright 
litigants should be compensated for protecting a right that benefits the public 
in addition to their own copyrights.245 
Of course, to mirror Congress’s decision to make awards of costs 
permissive under the 1976 Act,246 courts should still be afforded discretion 
 
 234. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra notes 165–74 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra notes 165, 168 and accompanying text. 
 237. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 238. See supra notes 188–90 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra notes 4, 165, 168–74 and accompanying text. 
 240. See supra notes 183–86 and accompanying text. 
 241. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991) (quoting Alyeska Pipeline 
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 258–59 (1975)). 
 242. See supra notes 165–74 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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in whether to allow a prevailing party to recover expert fees.  Making awards 
permissive rather than mandatory recognizes that copyright law is often 
ambiguous.247  Where there is ambiguity in the law, parties are encouraged 
to engage in risk-averse prophylactic tactics to mitigate their potential 
liability.248  Instituting a mandatory requirement for shifting of costs, 
attorney’s fees, or expert fees would unduly punish parties that bring 
objectively rational, but losing, claims or defenses to court. 
Accordingly, § 505 should be amended as follows: 
In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the 
recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States 
or an officer thereof.  Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court 
may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee and reasonable expert witness 
fees to the prevailing party as part of the costs. 
The word “reasonable” instructs courts to be wary of awarding the entirety 
of expert fees to a prevailing party, and it acknowledges that ex post review 
may reveal that the costs incurred may outweigh the costs necessary for the 
particular case.249  Further, it recognizes that courts may have to circumvent 
some of the anxieties that accompany a system where the loser pays.250  
Prevailing litigants should not be entitled to expert witness fees that are 
deemed to be unrestrained or abusive to the opposing party.251 
CONCLUSION 
This proposal acknowledges that the power to make law regarding fee 
shifting should rest with Congress.  Although some courts have interpreted 
“full costs” to be ambiguous with respect to whether Congress intended for 
prevailing parties under the Copyright Act to recover costs beyond those 
normally permitted, the Supreme Court’s holdings in Crawford Fitting, West 
Virginia University Hospitals, and Murphy make clear that courts may not 
allow prevailing parties to recover expert witness fees without the magic 
words:  “expert witness fees.” 
Nonetheless, Congress should amend 17 U.S.C. § 505 to allow for the 
recovery of expert witness fees.  Copyright law incentivizes the creation of 
unique authorships that are ultimately intended for the public to enjoy.  A 
litigant’s own copyright claim is one from which the public can benefit.  
Allowing parties with deeper pockets to dictate what copyright does and does 
not protect is against the public’s interest.  Accordingly, a fee-shifting statute 
that expressly allows for the recovery of expert witness fees helps to maintain 
the equilibrium between a creator’s property rights and the public’s access to 
a work. 
 
 247. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 248. See supra notes 146–50 and accompanying text. 
 249. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 250. See supra notes 15, 22 and accompanying text. 
 251. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
